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One of the first cases I teach in my required first-year course on 
constitutional law is McCulloch v. Maryland.1  Like other constitutional 
law teachers, I use McCulloch in part as a preview of approaches to 
constitutional interpretation—it offers up historical, textual, struc-
tural, and representation-reinforcing theories of interpretation.  Most 
relevant here, I emphasize that the historical approach to constitu-
tional interpretation in McCulloch actually represents two approaches.  
The first is what constitutional scholars most readily think of as his-
torical interpretation:  originalism.  That is the approach that many 
papers in this conference take, and the primary questions to which 
this conference is addressed.  Following that approach, much ink has 
been spilled on the original meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
the relationship between precursors to the Amendment and the 
Amendment itself, and the relationship between the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 
The second historical approach in McCulloch leads to a very differ-
ent kind of historical endeavor.  This approach assumes that constitu-
tional understandings are elaborated by historical practice in Ameri-
can history long after the founding.  Relevant history in McCulloch 
does not end with the writing of the Constitution; it develops over 
time up to the very moment of judicial intervention.  McCulloch thus 
suggests that the ways in which laypeople, politicians, scholars, law-
yers, and jurists interpret the Constitution during the decades and 
centuries since 1789 offer up important glosses on constitutional 
meaning. 
It is this second historical approach—the nonoriginalist historical 
approach—that this paper engages.  What concerns me here is not 
what the Thirteenth Amendment meant in originalist terms, but how 
its meaning has changed over time.  Unsurprisingly, dominant cur-
rents of political thought have influenced interpretations of the 
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Amendment at any given moment.  The meaning of the Thirteenth 
Amendment has diverged widely at different moments in history—
emphasizing the right to contract during the Lochner era, New Deal 
labor and economic rights in the 1930s and 1940s, and desegregation 
and antidiscrimination during the civil rights era of the 1960s. 
These shifting historical meanings of the Thirteenth Amendment 
offer up a resource for thinking about the Amendment’s purview to-
day.  That said, there is no linear or inexorable relationship between 
these changing meanings of the Thirteenth Amendment and new 
doctrinal arguments based on the Amendment.  Historical evidence 
does not lead to the conclusion that the Thirteenth Amendment re-
quires any particular legal outcome.  History can, however, provide 
resources for constitutional interpretation on two levels.  First, it re-
veals ways of thinking about the Amendment that have since disap-
peared from mainstream constitutional thought.  These alternative 
understandings of the Amendment can re-open questions that have 
long been thought settled.  Second, exploring the Amendment’s 
changing meanings invites scholars to contemplate the relationship 
between constitutional interpretations and historical contexts.  By 
analyzing that relationship in particular historical settings, current 
scholars and lawyers can gain a better understanding of why they use 
the Thirteenth Amendment as they do today, and how they might do 
so more self-consciously and without unnecessary (and perhaps un-
persuasive) claims to legitimacy through original intent. 
Toward these ends, this paper explores the ways in which political 
developments affected the understanding of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment during the fifteen years of constitutional and civil rights uncer-
tainty that lasted from the New Deal revolution until the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.2  During that period, 
lawyers in the newly created Civil Rights Section (“CRS”) of the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) used the New Deal as a springboard for a 
new and quite expansive understanding of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  Exploring their efforts at reinterpretation underscores both 
the process and the lessons of the nonoriginalist historical approach 
to constitutional interpretation.3 
 
 2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3 The discussion that follows draws on my prior work; most notably, RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE 
LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007), and Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment 
and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609 (2001). 
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* * * 
When CRS lawyers began aggressively prosecuting Thirteenth 
Amendment cases in the late 1930s and 1940s, they inherited a way of 
thinking about the Amendment closely tied to the Lochner era.  Dur-
ing the early twentieth century, the Department of Justice had prose-
cuted southern officials and individual employers under the Peonage 
Act of 1867.  A statutory enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
that act prohibited peonage, a form of involuntary servitude in which 
a worker was forced to work out a debt to an employer.  In the 1905 
case of Clyatt v. United States and the 1914 case of United States v. Rey-
nolds, the Court upheld the Peonage Act and indictments under it.4  
Moreover, in the 1911 state criminal case of Bailey v. Alabama, the 
Court invalidated a state contract labor law common in the South.  
The law presumed a criminal intent to defraud when an employee 
accepted an advance from an employer but broke his labor contract 
without repaying his debt to his employer.5 
The Court’s opinions in these cases predictably reflected a Loch-
ner-era focus on contractual freedom.  The problem in Bailey, as the 
Court saw it, was that the Alabama law functionally required specific 
performance for the breaking of a labor contract.  Although decided 
under the Peonage Act and the Thirteenth Amendment, the lan-
guage and logic of contract law and contract rights pervaded the opi-
nion:  “[t]he full intent of the constitutional provision could be de-
feated with obvious facility if, through the guise of contracts under 
which advances had been made, debtors could be held to compulsory 
service. . . . The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss 
due to the breach, but not to enforced labor.”6  In these peonage cas-
es, as in many Lochner-era cases, the Supreme Court saw itself as inter-
vening sporadically into private relationships to ensure the contrac-
tual freedom of the parties.7 
Even after the Lochner framework began to lose its hold on consti-
tutional understandings of individual rights in the late 1930s, the 
debt element of peonage kept enforcement of the Thirteenth 
Amendment closely tied to its contract-based interpretation.  Al-
though many instances of forced labor during the first half of the 
 
 4 235 U.S. 133 (1914); 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905). 
 5 219 U.S. 219, 231 (1911). 
 6 Id. at 242. 
 7 Similarly, the Court treated the criminal surety law it struck down in United States v. Rey-
nolds as punishing the violation of the contract between the criminal and the surety for 
whom he agreed to work in lieu of time served on the state chain gang.  235 U.S. at 147.  
See Aziz Z. Huq, Note, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351 (2001). 
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century did not involve contracted debt—as where employers main-
tained immobility through violence or threats of violence—every suc-
cessful federal involuntary servitude prosecution before 1937 in-
volved contractual indebtedness.  All three involuntary servitude cases 
that reached the Supreme Court during World War II—Taylor v. 
Georgia,8 United States v. Gaskin,9 and Pollock v. Williams10—also con-
formed to the conventional definition of peonage:  all three involved 
contracted debt, and all three arose under the Peonage Act of 1867.11 
During World War II, however, lawyers in the CRS began to un-
shackle the Thirteenth Amendment from the contract-based frame-
work of the Lochner era.  They began to draw on the New Deal rather 
than Lochner as they conceptualized both the government’s role in 
enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment and the substance of the 
Amendment’s prohibitions.  This new conceptualization led to three 
new and expansive interpretations of the Amendment.  The first con-
cerned the government’s role:  the lawyers shifted their understand-
ing of the government’s role from one in which the government oc-
casionally intervened into private contracts that had gone wrong to 
one in which the government had an ongoing obligation to protect 
individuals from rights violations.  The second two New Deal-based 
interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment were more substantive.  
In the second, the CRS lawyers drew on the New Deal’s commitment 
to free labor protections to inform the content of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  In the third, they drew on the New Deal’s guarantee of 
a minimum standard of living and working. 
* * * 
The New Deal influenced the CRS lawyers’ understanding of the 
Thirteenth Amendment in the first instance by providing the lawyers 
with a new model of the role of government in protecting rights.  
During the Lochner era, lawyers and judges had thought about peon-
age in terms of debt and the policing of contracts.  Once the New 
Deal offered wide-ranging statutory protections to many Americans, 
the government lawyers began to see an ongoing relationship be-
tween individuals and the federal government, with the government 
offering affirmative protection of rights.  They increasingly under-
 
 8 315 U.S. 25 (1942). 
 9 320 U.S. 527 (1944). 
 10 322 U.S. 4 (1943). 
 11 Pollock, 322 U.S. at 5–8; Gaskin, 320 U.S. at 527–28; Taylor, 315 U.S. at 26–30. 
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stood peonage as a “[f]ederally-[s]ecured [r]ight to [b]e [f]ree 
[f]rom [b]ondage.”12 
This conceptual transformation was rooted in the New Deal’s 
overall guarantees of security.  “Security” in the economic sense was 
the watchword of the federal government’s attack on the Depression 
of the 1930s.  New Deal legislation attempted to provide such eco-
nomic security (mostly for white men) through unemployment insur-
ance, public works projects, Social Security, relief, the protection of 
unions, and other economic and social welfare programs.  The New 
Deal thus demonstrated that the exercise of government power, ra-
ther than its restraint, might serve to safeguard the vulnerable.  At-
torney General Biddle made this very point in a lecture he delivered 
at the end of 1942.  He acknowledged that the Founders had been 
most concerned with a limited government.  He argued, however, 
that after the Industrial Revolution, Americans came to realize that 
“the powers of unregulated business had to be checked by transfer-
ring much of their control from private to public hands.”13 
The Truman administration reinforced this new emphasis on the 
government’s provision of affirmative protections.  When President 
Harry S. Truman created his groundbreaking Committee on Civil 
Rights in 1946,14 he declared the end of complacency “with a civil lib-
erties program which emphasizes only the need of protection against 
the possibility of tyranny by the Government.”15  Modern conditions 
required the creation of “new concepts of civil rights to safeguard our 
heritage.”16  The “extension of civil rights today,” Truman an-
nounced, “means, not protection of the people against the Govern-
ment, but protection of the people by the Government.”17 
In its final report, Truman’s Committee argued that increased na-
tional authority for protecting civil rights extended the “positive gov-
ernmental programs designed to solve the nation’s changing prob-
lems.”18  The report described how the Supreme Court had found in 
 
 12 Sydney Brodie, The Federally-Secured Right to Be Free from Bondage, 40 GEO. L.J. 367 (1952). 
 13 FRANCIS BIDDLE, DEMOCRATIC THINKING AND THE WAR:  THE WILLIAM H. WHITE LECTURES 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA [1942–1943], at 19 (1944). 
 14 See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS:  THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS vii (1947) [hereinafter TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS] (quoting Harry S. Truman, 
Statement on Executive Order 9808 (Dec. 5, 1946) (establishing the President’s Commit-
tee on Civil Rights)). 
 15 Address Before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1947 
PUB. PAPERS 311 (June 29, 1947). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 106. 
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the Constitution a “basis for governmental action at the national lev-
el . . . for such policies as the control of prices; regulation of agricul-
tural production; requirement of collective bargaining; social security 
benefits for millions of people; prohibitions of industrial monopo-
lies,” and more.19 The Committee built on those interpretations, con-
cluding that “freedom in a civilized society is always founded on law 
enforced by government.”20 
Truman and his committee also rejected the notion that the new 
governmental duty to provide security began and ended with eco-
nomic security.  Invoking FDR’s identification of “Freedom From 
Fear” as one of the Four Freedoms, the committee’s report made 
clear that fear did not stem from economic hardship and uncertainty 
alone.21  It grew as well out of the personal insecurity of living as a ra-
cial minority in a society that publicly and privately, systematically and 
informally, oppressed such minorities.  As a result, freedom from fear 
now required not only the economic safety net the New Deal had 
provided mostly white workers but also freedom from involuntary 
servitude, lynching, and police brutality for African Americans.22 
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, then, the New Deal’s catch-
phrase of “economic security” had mutated in some contexts into the 
“security of the person” or “the safety and security of the person.”  
The phrase drew on a venerable but long-submerged understanding 
of civil rights, with common law roots traceable to Blackstone’s 1765 
Commentaries23 and statutory roots in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and 
the Freedman’s Bureau Bill of the same year.24  Eighty years later, the 
security of the person formed a central component of the report of 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in 1947.25  And it was the 
phrase used to describe the category of harms that included involun-
tary servitude and peonage, lynching, and police brutality in the first 
casebook on civil rights, published in 1952.26 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 103. 
 21 Id. at vii. 
 22 See Frank Coleman, Freedom from Fear on the Home Front, 29 IOWA L. REV. 415, 416 (1944) 
(describing how federal prosecutions of lynch mobs and “village tyrants” following Pearl 
Harbor helped secure “freedom from fear”). 
 23 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *117, *125. 
 24 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Freedman’s Bureau Bill, ch. 
200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866). 
 25 See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 14, at vii. 
 26 1 THOMAS I. EMERSON & DAVID HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  A COLLECTION OF LEGAL AND RELATED MATERIALS 1 (2d ed. 1958) (noting that 
“[t]he right to security of the person . . . is a fundamental right”).  Language about the 
“security of the person” also occasionally resurfaced in some of the signal civil rights dis-
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Drawing on this conception of “the security of the person,” and 
this New Deal approach to civil rights more generally, the CRS law-
yers rejected the essence of Lochner-era peonage cases as the occa-
sional interference of courts into private contracts.  Instead, they fo-
cused on a direct, ongoing relationship between the executive branch 
of the federal government and its citizens.  In fact, they saw the Thir-
teenth Amendment as a particularly apt site for this new conception 
because, as CRS lawyer Sidney Brodie noted, the victims of peonage 
were often “defenseless or without capacity to pursue [their] personal 
remedies,” and the government needed to “act on its own initiative.”27 
Once the CRS lawyers based their understanding of the govern-
ment’s role in Thirteenth Amendment cases on a positive conception 
of rights, their use of the Amendment and related statutes changed.  
They began to use the Thirteenth Amendment beyond the specific, 
time-worn cases of peonage proper and beyond prosecutions under 
the Peonage Act itself.  In Circular No. 3591, Attorney General Biddle 
requested that United States attorneys “defer[] [prosecutions under 
the peonage statute] in favor of building the cases around the issue 
of involuntary servitude and slavery . . . disregarding entirely the ele-
ment of debt.”28  To accomplish this shift from contract-based peon-
age to the “federally-secured right to be free from bondage,” the CRS 
lawyers revitalized other statutory weapons from the recent and dis-
tant past.  The section put to use a Slave Kidnapping Statute from 
1866, which prohibited the holding of a person as a slave, as well as 
the 1932 Lindbergh Law, a federal kidnapping law passed after the 
abduction of Charles Lindbergh’s infant son.  Most significantly, for 
the first time since the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
Department of Justice used general civil rights laws to prosecute in-
voluntary servitude cases not based on an underlying debt.  Once the 
CRS lawyers read the Thirteenth Amendment as establishing a fed-
eral right, a pair of Reconstruction criminal civil rights statutes could 
provide far broader authority for prosecution than the Peonage Act 
alone.  Section 51 of the criminal code criminalized all conspiracies 
 
sents of the late nineteenth century, such as the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
36, 115–19 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555–56, 
560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 27 Brodie, supra note 12, at 376. 
 28 Francis Biddle, Department of Justice Circular No. 3591 (Dec. 12, 1941), in 16 JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES PRIOR TO 1960:  CRUCIAL DOCUMENTS FROM THE 
FILES OF ARTHUR BRANN CALDWELL 61–63 (1991) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CIVIL 
RIGHTS POLICIES]; see also Department of Justice Circular No. 3356, supp. no. 1 (May 21, 
1940), in JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES, supra at 12–35 (discussing 18 
U.S.C. §§ 51 and 52). 
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to violate rights guaranteed against private interference, and Section 
52 criminalized all governmental violations of constitutional rights. 
Because the Thirteenth Amendment lacked a state action require-
ment, it protected the right to be free from bondage against virtually 
all comers.29 
Even before Biddle made it a policy to use these general civil 
rights statutes, the CRS had begun experimenting with a variety of 
statutory cocktails that suggested the New Deal demotion of debt and 
contract.  The celebrated prosecution of the notorious William T. 
Cunningham in Oglethorpe County, Georgia, offers a prime exam-
ple.  As anti-peonage crusader William Henry Huff and others publi-
cized, Cunningham had provided his workers with so little food they 
frequently went hungry.  He threatened to beat them with a pistol if 
they could not keep his pace.  And he hunted his terrified, escaping 
workers all the way from Georgia to Chicago, where he convinced the 
police to arrest them.  Cunningham’s indictment included counts of 
conspiracy to deprive the farmworkers of the right to be free from 
slavery and involuntary servitude under § 51 and counts of holding 
them as slaves under the Slave Kidnapping statute, as well as the tra-
ditional counts of peonage under the 1867 act.30 
CRS investigations into the servitude of young black men working 
in the Florida cane fields illustrate the change even more dramati-
cally.  After Biddle’s circular, case titles altered from “Peonage” to 
“Involuntary Servitude,” and so did the emphasis of the FBI’s ques-
tions and the lawyers’ analyses of their trial evidence.  Before Biddle’s 
circular, questions and memos had focused on the amount and de-
tails of the debts the youngsters owed the sugar company.  After-
wards, the lawyers wrote memos organizing their investigative reports 
 
 29 GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 146, 323 n.11 (describing how the 1932 Lindbergh Law was 
put to use to accomplish the shift from peonage to involuntary servitude and citing John 
T. Elliff, Aspects of Federal Civil Rights Enforcement:  The Justice Department and the FBI, 1939–
1964, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 608–09 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 
1971)); Brodie, supra note 12, at 367 (noting the useful statutes that deal with slavery, in-
voluntary servitude, or peonage).  For the statutes, see Slave Kidnapping Act, ch. 86, § 1, 
14 Stat. 50 (1866) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1583 (2000)); Lindbergh Kidnapping 
Act, ch. 271, § 1, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1202 (2000)); 
Brodie, supra note 12, at 374 n.34 (citing unreported cases, including the unreported 
case of United States v. Gantt, No. 10, 031n (N.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 1949), which resulted in 
prosecution under forced labor statutes). 
 30 PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY:  PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH 1901–1969, at 175 
(1972) (describing the peonage charges against William T. Cunningham); GOLUBOFF, 
supra note 3, at 147, 324 n.14 (citing “Memorandum, May 1941, [file] 50-708, [RG 60, Na-
tional Archives]” [hereinafter DOJ Files]); I.L.D. Brings Charge of Peonage Against Georgia 
Planter, DAILY WORKER, Nov. 20, 1939, at 5. 
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by references to threats, shootings, and beatings, among other 
things.31 
Safeguarding the security of Americans against both public and 
private rights violations was institutionally, doctrinally, and culturally 
different from enforcing the narrow terms of the Peonage Act.  The 
New Deal had begun this trend with its promise of economic security.  
The CRS lawyers broadened it to include African Americans’ rights to 
the “safety and security of the person,” prime among which was the 
right to be free from bondage.  This conceptual shift suggested that 
African Americans as well as whites deserved “security,” that that se-
curity went beyond economics, and that affirmative federal power 
could and should be used to protect individuals.  When the CRS ex-
panded the “economic security” of the New Deal into the “safety and 
security” of African Americans, they transformed the Thirteenth 
Amendment from a bulwark against constitutionally problematic con-
tracts into a positive guarantee of freedom from servitude. 
* * * 
The CRS lawyers drew on the New Deal not only in thinking about 
the role of government in enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment but 
also to fill in the very substance of the Amendment’s protections.  
The second reconceptualization of the Thirteenth Amendment thus 
emerged out of the New Deal’s commitment to free labor.  In par-
ticular, it emerged out of the New Deal’s particular vision of what free 
labor meant. 
Since the debates that accompanied its proposal, advocates of an 
expansive vision of the Thirteenth Amendment had generally agreed 
that it was meant not only to end slavery and involuntary servitude 
but that it should, in the words of Attorney General Biddle, also 
guarantee “a system of completely free and voluntary la-
bor . . . throughout the United States.”32  What made labor free for 
the CRS lawyers during and after World War II differed substantially 
from what had made it free in the free-labor ideology of Reconstruc-
tion and in the freedom-of-contract jurisprudence of the Lochner era, 
however. During the Reconstruction era, the term carried connota-
 
 31 GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 109–114, 324 (citing DOJ files, 50-18-15). 
 32 Francis Biddle, Civil Rights and the Federal Law, in SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY TODAY:  
THE EDWARD L. BERNAYS LECTURES OF 1944 GIVEN AT CORNELL UNIVERSITY 109–144 
(1945).  For the classic treatment of antebellum free labor ideology, see ERIC FONER, 
FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:  THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE 
CIVIL WAR 11–51 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1970). 
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tions of the right to pursue a calling, the dignity of labor, and the au-
tonomy of the individual.  It also embraced the opportunity to find 
jobs, to advance economically, and to receive just compensation for 
labor.  This ideal provided part of the basis for Lochner-era liberty of 
contract, and it persisted with some force even after the Lochner era 
ended.33 
The “free and voluntary labor” to which Biddle tied the Thir-
teenth Amendment drew more directly on the New Deal, however.  
The essence of free labor became rights to organize, bargain, and 
strike.  “The tendency of modern economic life toward integration 
and centralized control,” an early version of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (“NLRA”) stated, “has long since destroyed the balance of 
bargaining power between the individual employer and the individ-
ual employee, and has rendered the individual, unorganized worker 
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, to secure a just reward 
for his services, and to preserve a decent standard of living.”34  In or-
der for the free-labor ideology of the Reconstruction and Lochner eras 
to become a reality in the twentieth-century United States, workers 
had to have the right to act collectively.35 
Even as the New Deal took steps to protect these labor rights, it 
largely forsook black workers’ rights by accommodating the racial hi-
erarchies and economic coercion of the southern labor market.  The 
NLRA, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and the Social Secu-
rity Act (“SSA”) all exempted from coverage the agricultural and do-
mestic work that most African Americans in the South performed.36  
The National Recovery Administration failed to eliminate regional 
 
 33 For an excellent discussion of laborers’ changing conceptions of free labor in the postbel-
lum period, see William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor:  Labor and the Law in the 
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 782–787, 801–814.  See also James Gray Pope, Labor and 
the Constitution:  From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1096–1104 
(1987); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 962–66 (1997); 
Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 
437–39 (1989); Risa Lauren Goluboff, The Work of Civil Rights in the 1940s:  The De-
partment of Justice, the NAACP, and African American Agricultural Labor 17–63 (Nov. 
2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author). 
 34 Labor Disputes Act, 78 CONG. REC. 3,444 (1934). 
 35 See generally James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause:  Labor 
and the Shaping of American Constitution Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46–122 
(2002). 
 36 For the NLRA, see National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000)).  For the FLSA, see Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 13(a)(6), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067 (current version at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–219 (2000)).  For the SSA, see Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 210(b)(1)–(2), 
811(b)(1)–(2), 907(c)(1)–(2), 49 Stat. 620, 625, 639, 643 (1935) (current version at 42 
U.S.C. § 301 (2000)). 
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wage differentials, and its local administrators maintained racial dif-
ferentials through discriminatory implementation.  Locally adminis-
tered federal relief agencies similarly catered to the Southern system 
by customarily cutting from the rolls workers needed for agricultural 
work during planting and harvesting seasons.  And the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act even strengthened the economic power of white 
planters at the expense of white and black tenants and sharecrop-
pers.37  New Deal legislation thus simultaneously embraced a new, ro-
bust definition of free labor and excluded from it a significant por-
tion of American workers.  Without addressing these New Deal biases 
and attacking the Southern labor market as a whole, the CRS lawyers 
realized, free labor would remain an elusive goal.38 
Drawing on this New Deal conception of free labor, the CRS used 
the Thirteenth Amendment to broaden the application of New Deal 
principles beyond the federal protections themselves.  CRS lawyers’ 
Thirteenth Amendment practice targeted for constitutional protec-
tion precisely those workers the New Deal left unprotected and un-
ions left organized.  As the lawyers saw the problem, workers who 
could not move physically or occupationally to exert market pressure 
were poor candidates for labor organization.  The immobility created 
by pervasive Southern laws—vagrancy, hitchhiking, contract labor, 
anti-enticement, and emigrant agent licensing laws—posed a barrier 
to organization and bargaining.  It therefore posed a barrier to the 
full and effective implementation of New Deal free labor principles.  
The ability to protect oneself from coercion by exercising the right to 
strike and the right to work for minimum wages under minimally ac-
ceptable conditions had become the means by which American work-
ers would resist labor exploitation.  They were the means by which 
workers could protect themselves against the kind of involuntary ser-
vitude the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited. Contemporary com-
mentator Howard Devon Hamilton recognized this when he included 
“resistance to organization and movement of agricultural labor” 
 
 37 See 1 HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS:  THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A 
NATIONAL ISSUE 34–57 (1978); NANCY J. WEISS, FAREWELL TO THE PARTY OF LINCOLN:  
BLACK POLITICS IN THE AGE OF FDR 163–68 (1983); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and 
Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 76 (1999); see also IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE:  AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005). 
 38 For discussions of the existence of a separate southern labor market until World War II, 
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among the obstacles that workers faced in violation of “the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s objective of a system of completely free and vo-
luntary labor throughout the United States.”39 
Over the course of World War II, top Justice Department officials 
increasingly tied the Thirteenth Amendment to such unfettered re-
gional and national mobility.  By the time Justice (and former Attor-
ney General) Robert Jackson penned the opinion in the 1944 peon-
age case of Pollock v. Williams,40 Attorney General Biddle had set 
himself squarely behind using the Thirteenth Amendment to create a 
unified labor market unimpeded by southern attempts to control the 
region’s black laborers.  In Pollock, the Court invalidated a contract 
labor statute similar to the laws the Court had struck down more than 
thirty years earlier in Bailey v. Alabama41 and less than two years before 
in Taylor v. Georgia.42  Despite the doctrinal similarities, the Court’s 
language indicated a newly expansive view of unconstitutional invol-
untary servitude deeply inflected with New Deal conceptions of free 
labor. 
Where the Bailey opinion emphasized the constitutionality of vari-
ous mechanisms of enforcing contracts, Pollock emphasized the rela-
tionship between this particular law and the labor market as a whole.  
Justice Jackson could not fathom the purpose behind a law meant to 
bind employees to particular employers.  Rather, he saw “the right to 
change employers” as the worker’s prime “defense against oppressive 
hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment.”43  He maintained that 
“[w]hen the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the 
obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incen-
tive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions 
of work.”44  Jackson warned that the “[r]esulting depression of work-
ing conditions and living standards affects not only the laborer under 
the system, but every other with whom his labor comes in competi-
tion.”45  Laws such as Florida’s contract labor statute, Jackson cau-
tioned, not only imposed immobility on particular individuals, but 
they depressed the labor market as a whole and infringed on the 
rights of all workers.46 
 
 39 Howard Devon Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment:  
What Is Not Involuntary Servitude, 10 NAT’L B.J. pt. 2, 72. (1952). 
 40 322 U.S. 4 (1943). 
 41 219 U.S. 241 (1911). 
 42 315 U.S. 25 (1942). 
 43 Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
July 2009] THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1463 
 
Justice Department lawyers took Justice Jackson’s observations and 
ran with them.  They saw that many state and local laws were de-
signed to keep the southern labor market impermeable.  So long as 
such laws continued to restrict some laborers in their bargaining 
power, laborers of all kinds and in all regions of the nation would not 
be truly free.  Echoing Jackson, section lawyer Brodie discussed 
“[t]he depressing effect of slave labor upon our society and economic 
system” in his 1951 article.47  He described “the detriment suffered by 
the public as well as by the individual victim who is forced to work for 
another against his will [as] serious and substantial.”48  A United 
States Attorney from Alabama was even more specific about the rela-
tionship between peonage and the labor market.  The purpose of us-
ing contract labor laws, he explained, was to get individuals “to work 
for less money than labor could be obtained ordinarily in the open 
market.”49 
Biddle and the lawyers in the Justice Department thus read Pollock 
and the other wartime cases as “substantially strengthen[ing] the fed-
eral guaranty of freedom from involuntary servitude.”  According to 
Biddle, Pollock placed “the right to freedom from involuntary servi-
tude on so broad a base that the way has been opened to an attack on 
the ‘enticing labor’ and ‘emigrant agent’ statutes, and some of the 
vagrancy statutes and ‘work or fight’ orders.”  The department had 
learned from experience that such laws had “proved to be in reality 
indirect means of enforcing involuntary servitude, especially against 
Negro farm hands and laborers.”  These laws were the very ones that 
minimized African American mobility, made employment recruit-
ment impracticable in the South, and closed off the channels of in-
formation necessary to facilitate widespread migration for work.50 
As a result, CRS lawyers and U.S. attorneys during and after the 
war made wholesale, rather than retail, efforts to eliminate peonage 
by ensuring that justices of the peace, county sheriffs, and local pros-
ecutors knew when they were violating the Thirteenth Amendment.  
United States Attorneys lobbied legislatures to repeal contract labor 
statutes like those the Supreme Court had struck down.  They tried to 
educate law enforcement officials by speaking at events like annual 
 
 47 Brodie, supra note 12, at 398. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 157, 326 n.37 (citing “Percy C. Fountain to attorney gen-
eral, July 15, 1948, DOJ Files, 50-1-24”). 
 50 See Goluboff, supra note 3, at 1656 n.180 (citing Francis Biddle, Civil Rights and the Fed-
eral Law, Speech at Cornell University 25 (Oct. 4, 1944) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal)). 
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meetings of the Georgia Peace Officers Association.  And they re-
peatedly wrote local officials about laws the Supreme Court had held 
unconstitutional.  They told the officials to “read [the Pollock opin-
ion] in full, so that you will understand the ruling of the Supreme 
Court.”51 
In its second use of the New Deal to inform the Thirteenth 
Amendment, then, the CRS not only targeted laws that created a par-
ticular employment relationship from which exit was difficult but also 
the larger legal framework that made it difficult for workers to leave 
all employment relationships.  Drawing on unrealized New Deal aspi-
rations for a free national labor market, Biddle concluded that vindi-
cating the Thirteenth Amendment meant far more than stopping a 
particular employer from directly coercing a particular employee.  It 
meant protecting truly free labor, even in the South and even, “espe-
cially,” for southern African Americans.  Biddle and his staff thus took 
the old, abolitionist, free-labor ideology, transformed it from the 
Lochner era for service in the post-New Deal era, and tried to make it 
constitutionally foundational. 
* * * 
The third influence of the New Deal on the CRS’s understanding 
of the Thirteenth Amendment similarly reflected unfulfilled New 
Deal aspirations.  As the nation put the war behind it, and predictions 
of a postwar recession largely fell flat, the CRS began to suggest that 
black agricultural and domestic workers, who had not shared signifi-
cantly in either the wartime economic boom or the nation’s postwar 
prosperity, might nonetheless find some measure of economic secu-
rity in the Thirteenth Amendment.  More than a decade after the 
New Deal promised better working conditions and an economic 
safety net for most Americans, these African American men and 
women were still denied rights to the most basic economic security.  
The New Deal’s guarantees of economic security in the FLSA, the 
SSA, and other laws were as racially exclusionary as the NLRA’s pro-
tections of labor rights.  As the Civil Rights Section turned its atten-
tion to the conditions in which these workers lived and worked, its 
 
 51 See GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 157–58, 327 n.40 (citing “J. Sewell Elliott to William M. 
Sneed, Justice of the Peace, and Sheriff J.R. Nix, n.d., NARA, RG 60, No. 50-19M-48,” and 
also pointing to “John P. Cowart to attorney general, Dec. 28, 1949, DOJ Files, 50-19-37; 
Alexander M. Campbell to director, FBI, Oct. 26, 1948, DOJ Files, 50-19-31; Herbert S. 
Phillips to Hon. Warren Olney, III, Apr. 16, 1953, DOJ Files, 50-18-63; Cowart to attorney 
general, Apr. 13, 1950, DOJ Files, 50-19-37”). 
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cases suggested that no worker in the United States, not even those 
excluded by political compromise, could constitutionally endure such 
extreme economic privation.  The lawyers suggested that the Thir-
teenth Amendment might protect workers unable to take advantage 
of New Deal economic rights, just as it might protect those unable to 
take advantage of New Deal labor rights. 
As the section lawyers increasingly defined the Thirteenth 
Amendment in terms of economic coercion in the late 1940s, they 
drew on changing academic, political, and popular meanings of pe-
onage and involuntary servitude.  These meanings stemmed from the 
social and economic “realities” of involuntary servitude, which the 
earlier attention to contract had overshadowed. Political scientist 
Howard Devon Hamilton, for example, defined peonage “[i]n every 
day parlance” as “used loosely to cover almost any variety of forced 
labor, or simply exploited labor.”52  Moreover, Hamilton extended his 
discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment from peonage proper to 
“peonage-like conditions,” condemning the latter as those in which 
“men get sick or die from overwork or bad conditions.”53  He dis-
cussed how contract workers were “farm[ed] out” to other employers 
during slack periods and how Mexican workers endured “hideous liv-
ing conditions and . . . low wages.”54  Hamilton was not alone in think-
ing that peonage encompassed all of these coercions and indignities. 
Although some lawyers continued to emphasize the importance of 
forced immobility in making out legal claims, the conditions of the 
work, the hardship it entailed, and the inadequate pay often sufficed 
to demonstrate “practical peonage” among non-lawyers.55 
Complaints to the Department of Justice and to organizations like 
the NAACP reflected these changes in the meaning of involuntary 
servitude.  Male agricultural laborers began to protest their lack of 
amenities, rather than the violent or contractual means by which they 
were forced to work.  They “wore rags” and slept in “chicken 
 
 52 HAMILTON, supra note 39, at 15. 
 53 Id. at 57. 
 54 Id. at 57–58. 
 55 Id. at 15, 57–58.  See, e.g., GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 161, 328 n.46 (citing “Allan Keller, 
22 Brooklyn Boys Flee Slave Farm, N.Y. WORLD-TELEGRAM AND SUN, Aug. 6, 1953, [at] 1”); id. 
(citing “NAACP, FBI Asked to Probe New York State Farm, news release, Aug. 6, 1953, in 
NAACP PAPERS, pt. 13A, 213”); Peonage:  Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Rela-
tions, Aug.–Oct. 1946, in 13C PAPERS OF THE NAACP 650–51 (August Meier ed., 1982) 
[hereinafter PAPERS OF THE NAACP]; Letter from Marian Wynn Perry, Assistant Special 
Counsel, NAACP to Edward Knott, Jr., Secretary, Meridian Branch, NAACP (Dec. 1, 
1947), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, supra, at 690. 
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house[s]” or on “old rusty cot[s].”56 Moreover, a new group of work-
ers began to complain about involuntary servitude in similar terms.  
Female domestic workers like Elizabeth Coker, Polly Johnson, and 
Dora Jones complained about the poor conditions of their working 
lives, their isolation from American freedom, and their exclusion 
from its plenty.57  They emphasized lack of pay, degrading conditions, 
and work too onerous for their sex.58  They rarely mentioned forced 
immobility. In fact, Polly Johnson testified not that she was kept by 
force, but that “she was not allowed to leave [her employer’s] prem-
ises except when [her employer] sent her to the store and then she 
had to return within a given period.”  Because Johnson could leave 
her workplace and home unaccompanied, the essence of her servi-
tude was not in the force by which she was held, but rather the condi-
tions that ensured that she would indeed “return within a given pe-
riod.”59  At the heart of such complaints was the sense that these 
women, as Elizabeth Coker put it, had “never enjoyed any [of the] 
privileges of a free person.”60 
Dora Jones’ similar complaints led to a watershed case in 1947.  
Judge Jacob Weinberger decided that the conviction of Elizabeth In-
galls for holding Jones as a slave was novel and important enough to 
warrant the publication of his opinion denying Ingalls’ motion for a 
new trial.61  Because the case was prosecuted under the Slave Kidnap-
ping Statute, the trial court emphasized the conditions of Jones’ life 
in a way never before discussed in a published opinion.62  The essence 
of slavery for the court was the subjection of the will of one individual 
to that of another.  For more than twenty-five years, Jones had been 
required to arise at an early hour in the morning and perform practically 
all of the household labor in connection with the maintenance of the In-
galls household.  She was forbidden to leave the household except for 
the commission of errands and performed drudgery of the most menial 
and laborious type . . . . 
 
 56 See, e.g., Letter from Clay A. Williams, Assistant Secretary, NAACP Committee, to Thur-
good Marshall, General Council, NAACP (Feb. 18, 1946), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, supra 
note 55, at 847–48. 
 57 Aff. of Polly Johnson (1946), in id. at 764; Aff. of Elizabeth Coker (Jan. 30, 1947) in 
PAPERS OF THE NAACP, supra note 55, at 390–91; see also Letter from Mattie Lomax to 
NAACP (Mar. 10, 1946) in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, supra note 55, at 752. 
 58 Aff. of Polly Johnson (1946), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, supra note 55, at 764. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Aff. of Elizabeth Coker (Jan. 30, 1947) in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, supra note 55, at 391; see 
also GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 162, 328 n.49 (citing “Walter Pate, FBI Report, Feb. 24, 
1945, DOJ Files, 50-67-9.”); Letter from Mattie Lomax to NAACP (Mar. 10, 1946) in 
PAPERS OF THE NAACP, supra note 55, at 752. 
 61 United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76, 77 (S.D. Cal. 1947). 
 62 Id. at 77–78. 
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All this, he noted, was performed “without compensation[,] . . . days 
off[,] . . . [or] vacation[s].”  Jones’ “quarters were among the poorest 
in the several homes occupied by the defendant during this period of 
years.”  Her board “was of a substantially lower standard than that 
common to servants generally.”63 
After detailing additional poor treatment, the court concluded 
that “the servant, Dora L. Jones, was a person wholly subject to the 
will of defendant; that she was one who had no freedom of action 
and whose person and services were wholly under the control of de-
fendant and who was in a state of enforced compulsory service to the 
defendant.”  The facts of Jones’ life spoke for themselves:  an individ-
ual exercising her free will would simply not have countenanced such 
treatment.  That Jones had opportunities to leave and did not sug-
gested all the more that she was indeed “wholly subject to the will of 
[the] defendant” with “no freedom of action” of her own.64  She was, 
as the Los Angeles Times put it, “a 20th century slave.”65 
The chain of reasoning that led to a conviction in Ingalls differed 
greatly from that which had led to peonage convictions less than a 
decade earlier.  In the intervening period, promising complaints be-
gan to include not only physical restraint and imprisonment but also 
the quality of the victims’ lives and the conditions of their work.  By 
1952, Ingalls represented an acute example of the modern slavery and 
involuntary servitude the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited.  In dis-
cussing the question whether “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” 
should be considered the same thing, CRS lawyer Sydney Brodie con-
cluded that because Ingalls had been such an extreme case, it had not 
disposed of the problem.66  “The sordid facts of the case actually es-
tablished more than mere unwilling labor, service rendered another 
because of duress, fear, threats or intimidation,” Brodie wrote.  Even 
someone with “privileges such as going home after work, receiving 
some remuneration, maintaining a form of private life,” privileges 
that Jones most certainly did not enjoy, might still “clearly be in a 
condition of involuntary servitude” even if not slavery itself.67 
Elizabeth Ingalls’s sentence also represented this new gloss on the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  Prior to Ingalls, criminal prosecutions of in-
voluntary servitude, like criminal prosecutions generally, primarily 
aimed to vindicate the government itself.  The perpetrator’s fine and 
 
 63 Id. at 77. 
 64 Id. at 78. 
 65 Daughter Tells More ‘Slave’ Case Details, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1947 at A1. 
 66 See GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 163, 329 n.57 (citing “DOJ files 50-12-3.”). 
 67 Brodie, supra note 12, at 388. 
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prison term served as restitution owed for violating the laws of the na-
tion.  In a departure from the past, Judge Weinberger required In-
galls to provide restitution to Jones in the amount of $6,000.  This was 
above and beyond Ingalls’s suspended prison sentence and a $2,500 
fine she had to pay the government.  The harm, then, was not only 
against the government but also against Dora Jones personally.  The 
case had made much of the Ingallses’ failure to pay Jones, and the 
sentence provided her with remuneration for her work. 
As Ingalls drew headlines, waves of similar complaints hit the DOJ.  
Whereas in 1946, CRS attorney Leo Meltzer had described Polly 
Johnson’s case as “not the ordinary type of peonage or involuntary 
servitude situation,” by 1948 such cases were legion.  The complain-
ants described, almost uniformly, how the victims worked long, hard 
hours with little or no pay other than paltry room and board and 
some clothing to wear.  The lack of schooling these victims received, 
and the lack of modern amenities they could access, indicated that 
such workers lacked freedom in the modern, postwar sense of the 
word.68 
The CRS saw some success in other cases like Ingalls.  Yet the sec-
tion lawyers still sought better enforcement mechanisms for such cas-
es.  Though the conditions in which some people lived seemed 
“shocking,” U.S. attorneys and the lawyers in Washington lamented 
that they were “only a violation of the laws of civilized society and not 
the laws of the Federal Government.”  In 1951, both the Senate and 
the House considered legislation to bolster the legal tools for elimi-
nating involuntary servitude.  As part of the House consideration of 
the bill, Civil Rights Section Chief George Triedman testified before a 
subcommittee about the need for further changes to the involuntary 
servitude statutes.69  Complaints of forced labor conditions kept “com-
ing up and hitting us constantly,” Triedman reported.  He and his at-
torneys found themselves “powerless to go forward” with prosecutions 
 
 68 See GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 164, 329 n.55 (citing “Leo Meltzer to file, memorandum, 
Oct. 22, 1946, DOJ Files, 50-79-2; FBI Report, Maurice D. duBois, Oct. 20, 1950, DOJ 
Files, 50-35-6,” and also pointing to “Henry A. Donahoo, FBI Report, Jan. 5, 1948, DOJ 
Files, 50-1-23; Joseph A. Canale, FBI Report, Mar. 13, 1952, DOJ Files, 50-40-22; Special 
Agent George A. Gunter, FBI Report, July 1, 1948, DOJ Files, 50-350; T. Vincent Quinn to 
James M. Carter, Jan. 26, 1948, DOJ Files, 50-12-6; John B. Honeycutt, FBI Report, Apr. 3, 
1948, DOJ Files, 50-41-51; Andrew M. Smith, FBI Report, Nov. 16, 1951, DOJ Files, 50-1-
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 69 See id. at 166, 329 n.59 (citing “Chester L. Sumners to attorney general, June 23, 1950, 
DOJ Files, 50-40-18; T. Vincent Quinn to director, FBI, memorandum, Dec. 30, 1947, DOJ 
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under the laws as they then stood.  They were “frustrated with a situa-
tion where a condition exists like this.”  Although the section had few 
attorneys and no need “to borrow any more work,” it nonetheless 
pursued wider jurisdiction in involuntary servitude cases.70  “[T]here 
are actual cases of happenings that have come across my table as well 
as members of my section and there are no other laws to meet them,” 
Triedman explained.  “That is what prompted us, even at this late 
date, even after 75 years, to come in and see if we can modernize 
them a bit.”71 
The cases Triedman brought to Congress’s attention illustrated 
how much the section’s view of the Thirteenth Amendment and in-
voluntary servitude was now informed by the New Deal’s economic 
protections.  The classic case of peonage—of the poor black man in 
the rural South held for debt in either agricultural or rural nonagri-
cultural work (like timber or sugar refining) by violence, threats of 
violence, and arrest—had given way to a New Deal-based understand-
ing about who was forced to work and how.  Of the four prototypical 
cases Triedman described to the committee, only two conformed to 
the traditional image of involuntary servitude:  one employer held his 
worker through violence and another through threats of arrest.  The 
other two both involved female victims, one of whom was a domestic 
worker.  Triedman spent a considerable part of his testimony describ-
ing the women’s plight and the federal law’s inability to help them.72 
The CRS thus used its Thirteenth Amendment practice to com-
plement the gaps in the New Deal’s economic protections.  The CRS 
aimed to protect not just industrial and agricultural workers, but all 
workers.  The section included domestic workers normally thought to 
occupy a private sphere immune from governmental intervention.  
Although Triedman tried to assure his congressional audience that 
his bill “would effect no radical change in existing law and would not 
extend the jurisdiction of the Department to any new situation or 
type of case,” his domestic worker example belied those reassurances.  
Such examples were revolutionary, as they indicated a willingness to 
use federal law to intrude into relationships of household labor, rela-
 
 70 Peonage and Slavery:  Hearing on H.R. 2118 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 82d Cong. 18 (1951) (statement of George Triedman, Chief, Civil Rights Section, 
Civil Division, Department of Justice). 
 71 Id. at 13–14. 
 72 Id. at 13–14, 18. 
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tionships that Congress had deemed local, private, and off-limits to 
the federal government.73 
The content of the Thirteenth Amendment in the CRS’s cases 
thus came once again from the New Deal.  The economic coercion 
that ensured immobility in such cases—evidenced not by violence or 
force of law but by the individual’s apparent inability to save herself 
from objectionable conditions—had never before received systematic 
federal attention.  But the New Deal’s partial promise to provide eco-
nomic security to the American people had wrought a revolution in 
expectations about work, working conditions, and free will.  Against 
the backdrop of promised federal protection for minimum wages, 
maximum hours, collective bargaining, and free movement within 
the labor market, a person choosing his or her employment would 
obviously not choose to work very long days under squalid and de-
humanizing conditions.  The baseline was a low one.  As the judge 
had suggested in Ingalls, Dora Jones was properly compared to other 
domestic workers who were not enslaved, not to some middle-class or 
even working-class ideal.  It was not, however, necessary for the condi-
tions to deteriorate so far that the victims became slaves without any 
free will at all before the federal government could intervene.  Ra-
ther, as section lawyer Sydney Brodie made clear in 1951, the Thir-
teenth Amendment could protect even those who (unlike Jones) en-
joyed “privileges such as going home after work, receiving some 
remuneration, [and] maintaining a form of private life.”74 
* * * 
By the early 1950s, then, much had changed from the Lochner era.  
In slightly different ways, each of the section’s three expansive inter-
pretations of the Thirteenth Amendment showed how African Amer-
icans could benefit from new, New Deal-based conceptions of positive 
rights.  The first interpretation understood New Deal promises of “se-
curity” to encompass the “safety and security of the person,” includ-
ing peonage and involuntary servitude.  The second expanded the 
New Deal’s free labor protections to the South and to the African 
American agricultural and domestic workers purposefully restricted 
by state laws and purposefully unprotected by federal ones.  And the 
last expanded New Deal rights to economic security to the same two 
groups legislatively excluded from such protections. 
 
 73 Id. at 28.  See generally SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS:  GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN 
NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY xi–xii (1998). 
 74 See Brodie, supra note 12, at 388. 
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Each of these expansions of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protec-
tions built on a different application of the New Deal’s concern for 
workers to African American workers specifically.  Where the New 
Deal had emphasized labor and economic rights and assisted African 
Americans only partially and incidentally, these novel involuntary ser-
vitude prosecutions aimed to bring African Americans within the New 
Deal rights framework.  Following changing trends within the invol-
untary servitude complaints of African Americans themselves, the 
CRS lawyers went about expanding the meaning of involuntary servi-
tude—and the accompanying protection of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment—in order to make the Constitution serviceable for African 
Americans in the post-New Deal era. 
The close correspondence between the CRS’s Thirteenth 
Amendment practice and New Deal conceptions of governmental 
protections of rights becomes even clearer when viewed not only in 
contrast to the Lochner-era, contract-based Thirteenth Amendment 
paradigm that preceded it but also to the conception of the Thir-
teenth Amendment in the succeeding era.  When the Supreme Court 
discussed the Thirteenth Amendment at length for the first time in 
twenty-five years in the 1969 case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,75 the 
Amendment was hardly recognizable.  In Jones, the Court addressed 
the question of whether a civil rights statute passed pursuant to the 
Thirteenth Amendment could proscribe private discrimination in 
housing.  According to the Court, the Amendment empowered Con-
gress to protect the freedom of African Americans “[a]t the very 
least . . . to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wher-
ever a white man can live.”76  In concurrence, Justice William O. 
Douglas offered a long list of the “badges of slavery” he thought Con-
gress could prohibit under the Thirteenth Amendment.  These in-
cluded discrimination in voting and jury service; segregation of cour-
trooms, schools, transportation, public accommodations, and 
housing; and bans on interracial marriage.  In this description, the 
prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment were essentially the same 
as the Fourteenth Amendment with one major difference: unlike the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth had no state action re-
quirement.  Because the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery 
and involuntary servitude wholesale, the Court reasoned, legislation 
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passed on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment, like that at issue 
in Jones, could proscribe private as well as public discrimination.77 
From the perspective of the pre-Brown era, the most striking thing 
about the Jones Court’s description of the Thirteenth Amendment 
was not what it included but what it omitted: any mention of labor or 
economic rights.  Although labor questions pervaded the Reconstruc-
tion-era history the Court cited to support its view of the Amend-
ment, that labor pedigree was detached from the Court’s description 
of how the Thirteenth Amendment operated in 1969.  Justice Doug-
las’ long list of racial wrongs did not even mention labor or employ-
ment. 
Just as the early twentieth-century understanding of the Thir-
teenth Amendment derived from Lochner-based free contract and the 
mid-century paradigm took its cues from the New Deal, the Court’s 
framing of the Thirteenth Amendment in this way was a product of 
the times.  In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education78 in 1954, 
lawyers, courts, and commentators had generally converged on a civil 
rights framework characterized by a focus on formal equality and a 
negative understanding of rights as constraining rather than enabling 
government action.  By 1969, equal protection analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment had become the dominant way of thinking 
about civil rights:  it prevented government actors from segregating 
or discriminating on the basis of race in a variety of circumstances.  
As a result, by the time the Court decided Jones, it was difficult to en-
vision the Thirteenth Amendment as anything but an equal protec-
tion guarantee without a state action requirement. 
* * * 
Discussion of the variety of uses to which scholars, lawyers, and 
legislatures have put the Thirteenth Amendment in more recent 
years is beyond the scope of this paper.79  Gesturing at the way in 
which one burgeoning new vision of the amendment—that reflected 
 
 77 Id. at 445–46 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 78 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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on the freedom of workers.  See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment:  Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1316 
n.13 (2007) (collecting sources on uses of the Thirteenth Amendment); see also Pope, su-
pra note 35. 
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in Michael Wishnie’s paper for this symposium—might benefit from 
the history I have told here will have to suffice.  According to Wish-
nie, the Thirteenth Amendment can, and should, be used to protect 
immigrants, and especially immigrant workers, suffering exploitation, 
immobility, and servitude as a result of their economic and immi-
grant status. 
My paper might serve as an interpretive resource for arguments 
like Wishnie’s in two ways.  First, this paper provokes the question of 
why contemporary lawyers and legal scholars (for Wishnie is not 
alone) have begun to think about the protections the Thirteenth 
Amendment might offer immigrants.  In an era of massive globaliza-
tion, a greater focus on international human rights, and a growing 
trans-national antislavery movement, this focus should be no surprise.  
Awareness of the connection between Wishnie’s doctrinal arguments 
and the larger political and legal trends that support it can facilitate 
more trenchant, and perhaps more successful, legal arguments.  To 
the extent that past visions of the Amendment have succeeded be-
cause they have traded on widely held assumptions about the nature 
of legal protection and those entitled to it, novel understandings of 
the amendment might do well to follow their lead. 
Second, the history I have told here suggests a deep strain in Thir-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence for the kinds of arguments that 
Wishnie and others hope to make.  It is not necessary to prove that 
the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment were concerned with im-
migrant labor in order for history to be useful to today’s advocates.  
Rather, the history of the Thirteenth Amendment in the Lochner era, 
the New Deal, and the 1960s reveals how significantly the meaning of 
the Thirteenth Amendment has changed over time.  Lawyers who 
draw on current concerns about citizenship and exclusion, migration 
and immigration, globalization and internationalization are no less 
legitimate heirs to the Thirteenth Amendment than the lawyers of 
the CRS in creating their New Deal-inflected vision of labor freedom 
and economic security.  The meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment 
was not fixed in time in 1865, nor in 1911, nor 1945, nor 1969. Ar-
guments about its meaning today can draw on the historical, not the 
original, pedigree of the Amendment even as they interpret it anew. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
